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SUNDAY, MARCH 18, 1917.

A LINE O' CHEER EACH DAY O' THE YEAR.

First printing of an original poem, written for
The Washington Herald.

By John Kendrick Buns.

AS TO THE DAYS.

Good days, bad days,
Days of pain or song;
Dark days, glad days,
As they fly along,
Whatever kind they be,
Evil days or blest,
Make as far as each may be
Every day the best.
(Copyright, 1917.)

The old Rumanian drive has been
silent for some time.

Mr. King seems willing to listen to
everybody but mediation.

Forget the strikes and the war. Just
think what they are up against in Rus-
sia.

Why not have a carnival, queries a
New Hampshire paper. We'll bet,
why not?

A club for English actors is seri-
ously considering the name of "Pan
America" club.

Another horror resulting from mar-
riage will be pointed out in the pre-
sent Russian riot.

If you don't believe in the high
cost of living take a slant at what it
costs to keep the Astor baby for a year.

From the wave of patriotism that is
spreading over the country, Herr Zim-
mermann has done his share toward
uniting the United States.

The company congratulates Presi-
dent King and the union announces
that they are pleased with the strike.
What is the view of the public?

A regiment of preachers is being
raised to enlist should war be
declared. According to the Sherman
definition they should know the sub-
ject.

It's all in the point of view. While
America is raging at the wholesale
plotting done by Von Bernstorff, the
Kaiser is just as wrathful because he
did not do enough.

Whether there has been an "overt"
act or not, the fact that United States
trade has dropped off \$190,000,000 be-
cause of the U-boat warfare is quite
some reason for arming ships.

Not satisfied with the two-bit-a-day
diet test a New Yorker has come forth
with a 5-cent meal which he alleges
will make the eater fat. These diets
seldom become universal, however.

They are about to revive the un-
written law in Virginia to supply it
to a case that has aroused widespread
interest throughout the State. If the
law is so absolute, why not write it?

Harvard students are not taking
kindly to the edict that bars them
from showing their bare legs in their
annual show. Cheer up, the bathing
season will soon be here.

The Mann act doesn't seem to re-
act so terribly on Illinois. A man
convicted under the law was sent
to sit five minutes in the court-
room and after serving thirty seconds
of the sentence he was allowed to go.

USE FORDOT MY PIECE.

Ise dot a piece to speak;
I hates to speak it, too,
'Cause for about a week
Rehearsin's all I do.
Jes' when Ise playin' fine
Viv' Dolly on my knee,
Someone says "Caroline,
Come speak your piece to me!"
I says it for my pa—
But he don't even look!
I says it for mama,
I says it for the cook;
I says it for the maid,
I says it for the cat,
Until Ise mos' afraid
I don't know where Ise at!
They dressed me up at last
In satin and lace,
An' rushed me here so fast
I dot red in the face;
Like other girls and boys
Pa says Ise goin' to spout;
It's jest like so much noise,
I don't know what's about!
It's funny as can be
To say my piece to you;
It's dot no sense to me—
But that's what I mus' do.
Oh, dear—what has I done?
My troubles never cease,
Ise spoke to every one,
But Ise fordoot my piece.
By T. SWANN HARDING.

Russia a Republic?

A search through modern history
reveals no stranger, more wonderful
story than that which is coming out
of Russia now.

The Romanoff line did not fall with
"its boots on," fighting, straining its
enemies to the uttermost, but col-
lapsed in a pitiful heap, almost with-
out the show of resistance, when the
populace made its first tentative test-
ing of its muscles and its inner
strength.

The bureaucrats, apparently, fled to
cover like "rats in a hole," whence
they are being dragged out now,
shuddering, to the light, either for the
Siberian exile to which they have
doomed so many of their compatriots,
or in cases of proved treason, for the
final experience in front of a white-
washed wall which so many of them
have richly deserved.

This Slavic revolution, involving a
nation of 180,000,000 people, terri-
torially the largest and potentially
the most powerful on the globe, is a
matter which on its surface aspects
has all the magic and speed of a
sleight-of-hand performance, but years
of preparation have gone before, the
years of grinding despotism which
brought out all the evil spawn of
Nihilism and anarchy to traffic in the
name of free institutions. The Slav
has paid a heavy price for the miracle
he has wrought, and well deserves a
complete tender of the constitutional
freedom which now seems within his
grasp.

Are the Russians capable of estab-
lishing a republic, or will they be
content with the continuance of the au-
tority under milder forms and with
constitutional guarantees? The for-
mer is the more likely. The revolution
could not have been accomplished
without the assistance of the
army. Yet throughout history the
military power has been the surest
and most consistent bulwark of des-
potism. The action of the Russian
army is a splendid tribute to the Slav
soul, but it contains no assurance
that in the future organized mili-
tarism may not be able to use the
army for the restoration of the au-
tority now deposed. For that reason
Russia had best make a clean job of
it, for her people, under the brilliant
Duma leadership, seem ripe to go
from the extreme of absolutism to the
extreme of democracy, and ready to
break all the bonds of medievalism.

The First Retreat.

The postponement of the rail strike
for forty-eight hours proves clearly
that the brotherhoods are not deaf to
reason.

It proves that there is no inexor-
able finality in their fiat, even when
they proclaim that all bridges have
been burned behind them and that no
retreat is possible.

This entering wedge will be like the
first small break in the dikes of Hol-
land; it will unloose a flood of new
light and new counsel in the brother-
hood ranks, and show them it is pos-
sible to gain their ends without using
the club they so confidently brandish
over a frightened but more or less
determined country.

When the fight came the fight for
mediation had been more than half
won. A new mood, a new frame of
mind will dominate the brotherhoods'
leaders on Monday. It is clear, also,
that the issue they have raised must
be met. They are perfectly right in
protesting against the unreasonable
delay in reaching a ruling on the
Adamson act, which alone prevents
its enforcement; they have shown be-
fore they are in no mood to be trifled
with and if they make a complete
surrender to public need now, there is
every reason why they should be
supported in their anxiety to reach
a decision in the battle which they
have been fighting for so many
months.

The Paper Problem.

The real fruits of the newspaper
paper shortage are becoming evident,
and in such manner that the public
is beginning to feel the effect. Dur-
ing the past year much has been writ-
ten that would tend to prepare the
public for the inevitable consequences
that must follow, but, owing to the
fact that most of the publishers had
paper contracts that carried them be-
yond the first of the present year, the
actual effect was postponed.

Daily announcements from the lead-
ing newspapers in the country that
their feature sections will be elimi-
nated is but a foretaste of what seems
destined to happen. One large news-
paper has attacked the shortage prob-
lem with such radical measures that
it will soon be printing but eight
pages whereas formerly the average
size of the paper was twenty-four
pages.

In the new order of things the fea-
ture seems doomed and news stories
will be virtually "cut to the bone." Dramatic publications are heralding
the fact that before long the Sunday
theatrical page will pass. This, they
believe will have a tendency to dis-
tribute dramatic advertising through-
out the week instead of having the
bulk appear on Sunday as is the case
now.

It is to be hoped that the efforts of
the Federal Trade Commission to-
ward fixing a standard price for the
newsprint article will be attended
with success, as the fate of the small-
er publishers hangs upon the commis-
sion's action.

"A Review of American Foreign Policy During the World War"

President's Erstwhile Diplomatic Course of Seem-
ing Neutrality a Masterpiece Which Has
Awakened the Entire Nation.

By ARCHIBALD M. JAMIESON.

A rationale of American policy in the
world war cannot yet be developed in its
entirety. The rupture with Germany,
however, closed one chapter and opened
another. A certain perspective on our
diplomacy can now be attained.

What does the present drift towards
war with Germany mean? A mere ven-
dication of our maritime rights, a stand-
ing order of the sea against the pro-
tection of commerce? Such it appears
on the surface, and such is the legal,
the diplomatic garb to cover the structure,
the framework of American policy which
has been developing since the day Ger-
many made the sword.

American policy, something which
does not show transparently in the State
Department "white book" containing the
myriad notes Mr. Lansing has addressed
to Germany since the beginning of sub-
marine warfare. Policy is entirely
apart from legalism. Diplomacy is not
their actions solely on their legal rights.
Holland, for instance, has not followed
the example of the United States in
breaking with Germany and arming her
ships, although she is suffering far more
severely from the U-boat program, and
is keenly aware that her legal rights
have been invaded. It is not her policy
to antagonize Germany, for obvious rea-
sons: she regards the law of self-
preservation as higher than any man-
made law.

Policy Once a Yoke.

American foreign policy three years ago
was one of those pleasant, popular fic-
tions which once upon a time, in the
July purposes, and misfits like William
Jennings Bryan used for the propagation
of harmless theories. We had the Wash-
ingtonian tradition of "isolation" and
freedom from entangling alliances; the
Monroe doctrine, the "open door" and
decaying canyons of "Dollar Diplomacy,"
a curiously uneven Caribbean policy, and
a nebulous determination to assist the
evolution of popular government in
Mexico.

The European war caught us unpre-
pared. President Wilson, declared the
formal neutrality of the United States.
That neutrality was based on traditional
American isolation from the blood-feuds
of Europe.

But the war had not proceeded many
months before it became apparent that
isolation was becoming a shibboleth,
shibboleth that America was to be
dragged out into the world, must take
cognizance of such things as consents
and balances of power, no matter how
incongruously self-sustaining and provincial
she might be at heart.

Wilson a Secret Helmsman.

President Wilson perceived this from
the first and knew that the most deli-
cate problems was to know how and
when to abandon "isolation" and edu-
cate his public to assuming its share of
international responsibility. He allowed
public opinion to go forward "under its
own steam," making little or no attempt
to stimulate it. He shared the action
was carefully concealed. American
sentimentality he paid little or no attention
to. Sentimentality is shallow, and pro-
foundly inimical to the United States, he
knew, would prove a decidedly slender
need for any statesman to lean upon;
as a responsible policy was concerned,
therefore he seemingly ignored it; or,
rather, he waited its translation into
sterner stuff. Formally, he deplored it
and scored "hyphenates" leaning to
either side of the European quarrel. But
the very abandonment of the action of
"isolation," literally forced upon the na-
tion, meant in itself an abandonment of
rigid neutrality, although there was
never any real acknowledgment of this
fact until the President offered the sup-
port of America to either one of the
group of belligerents which accepted his
plan for effecting permanent peace among
the nations.

Perhaps the true significance of the
President's famous "peace note" to the
belligerents, and his subsequent address
to the Senate, was that it marked the
end of a century, and more, of isolation
has come; that this country was
willing to cast its lot with the nations
which were fighting for ideals approxi-
mating our own.

DIFFERENTIAL NEUTRALITY.

The outbreak of war found the United
States a neutral with a huge stake in
the outcome of the conflict, but with only
one safe course at first to adopt. The
President devised the world of our neu-
trality. With the knowledge of the
mixed population and with blood
and racial ties giving a dangerous impulse
to hyphenism, he invoked the whole
American people to be neutral in thought,
and spirit, to follow the example of the
government, and that he should fail; it
was natural, just as inevitable, that in
due course the shadow of American
self-interest should give American neu-
trality an altogether different color from
what it was originally designed to have.

To the public, neutrality has meant an
impartial, detached point of view; a de-
sire to deal with the outcome of the war
and the enforcement of American
and international law with rigid, inflex-
ible, almost automatic determination
against both parties to the conflict. To
the public there has been no middle
zone, no point between actual belliger-
ency and complete detachment. Isolation
war. Such a neutrality could be based
only on the assumption that the United
States was as little involved in the issues
of the conflict as any messenger from
Mars might be.

All False and Unsound.

This assumption was false and unsound,
and a neutrality based upon it
was bound to end in becoming only a
legal and an official fiction.

There are abundant reasons for
stating that at an early hour in the
war the President, and his advisers,
reached the conviction that the best
interests of the United States approxi-
mated the interests of the belligerents,
and that the victory of the Central
Powers would be a menace to this
nation and to democracy wherever it
existed.

Having reached this conclusion, it is
possible to believe that the President
would stand in the way of our formal
and legal neutrality being converted into
a neutrality which, so far as policy and
practice were concerned, was "benevo-
lent" and favorable to the group of na-
tions whose cause he believed to be
American self-interest.

Against this there was the general
policy that "the war involved no Ameri-
can interest so important as that of
declining to be sucked into its inevita-
ble losses, its civil sufferings, and its
malignant hatreds." There has been a
constant balancing and readjustment of
these two ideas, and while the United
States found it both logical and politic
to depart from rigid neutrality from the
first of the war, there was nothing ap-
proaching a state of belligerency until
national interest was at stake.

As a matter of fact, in policy and practice
every move of the United States in
the European situation for the past two

years has been favorable to the allies
and against Germany. We have justified
our position in the world with the en-
tirety of our financial assistance to them,
on the score of our legal right; and the justifi-
cation has been sound and irrefragable.

Yet if these powers in control of the
seas represented a cause detrimental to
American self-interest, is it not certain
that ways of stopping this traffic would
have been found without abridgment
of our neutrality? An embargo act, for
instance, might have been passed by
Congress at the instigation of the Presi-
dent, and the mere legal justification of
the act would have been shelved and
pocketed.

There is a middle ground between
actual participation in war and mere
passive, disinterested neutrality, and it
is in this ground that the American gov-
ernment has stood. At first there was
a brief effort to maintain genuine
detachment; but it was modified after
the significance of the Belgian crime
was digested by Washington, and van-
ished altogether after the Lusitania
tragedy. Technical, formal, neutrality
was maintained, and when pro-German
howled in rage over the evident trend
of American policy, their arguments were
splintered by the impeccable legalism by
which our diplomats justified every move.

Backed Up by the Law.

The law was there, an elastic thing
which permitted the American govern-
ment to do everything it desired to do;
the Department was scrupulously
correct in every move it made, and those
who shouted the charge "unneutral" at
the President were simply left to cry in
the wilderness.

There has been a slow but sure de-
viation from the path of actual neu-
trality since the first few months of the
war, culminating in the "break" with
Germany last month. Had this deviation
not been based fundamentally on the
conviction that the German cause approx-
imated autocracy and the allied cause
liberty, it would have been based on
the murder of Americans on the high
seas, the atrocities in Belgium and
France, and the plottings and lawless-
ness of German agents on American soil.
The fundamental impulse benevolently
toward the cause of the entente was given
double strength by the outcry by the
Germans themselves. Legal neutrality
was maintained by vigorous protest
against such allied practices as the or-
ders in council affecting a blockade of
Germany, the blacklist, the seizure of
ships, but there was no real intention
of inclination to pocket such violations of
neutral rights because of the greater is-
sue involved.

The New Republic said on this point

(written before the break):
"If the President had been really indiffer-
ent to which side won, this (the abso-
lute in assistance on our trade rights) is just
the course she would have taken. She did
not take it because American public
opinion would not have sanctioned a
course of action that might conceivably
stimulate Germany to more active action
against the American people. She has
been leading in this direction and they would
also see that to protect temporary trade
rights at the cost of British defeat would
be to sacrifice the lesser to the greater."

Between Devil and Blue Sea.

"One fact is clear: the refusal of the
American people to face squarely the
necessary implications of their undoubted
decision that, in the event of a victory
favorable to the German power, the
struggle would have been a success. She
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ports when the Lusitania tragedy came.
But we decline to accept the Roosevelt
dictum that the question should have
been dealt with as a moral absolute:
that the course followed by the President
was national disgrace and dishonor. The
fact that the question of peace or war,
at that time, could not be simplified into
a mere question of national morality,
however, much the "Jingoes" and the
imperialists tried to make it appear as
such.

Divested of emotionalism, the question
was whether we would take the only
form of reparation and disavowal it was
in Germany's power to make without
recourse to the "heroic remedial purge"
of war. There are persons who have
argued as if it was would have restored the
hundreds of American lives which were
sufficed out; as if war were a sacred
rite through which national honor could
be avenged; as if there were no moral or
alternative but war; as if we were
not the question of peace or war, at
which admittedly are in an epic fight for
their existence, while for us it would
only have been a war for revenge.

The course actually pursued by the
President, namely, the direct appeal to the
ragged ineptitude of former Secretary of
State Bryan, resulted, in the end, in
the casting out of von Tirpitz from the
German admiralty, the marked limitation
of the illegal submarine campaign for
nearly two years, and the direct appeal was
accepted in principle by the United
States.

Staved Off Lawlessness.

"Note writing" received ridicule as
pure futility, but a matter of fact
was not futile, as a dispassionate review
of our diplomatic correspondence with
Germany will show. It had a sufficient
edge of force in it to stave off Teuton
factory lawlessness in greater measure
than it could have been expected to do.
From April, 1915, to February, 1917,
and this, merely as a practical achieve-
ment in the saving of tonnage which
might otherwise have been lost, has been
the highest value to the entente in the
winning of the war. Had the United
States broken and drifted into war with
Germany after the Lusitania crime, it is
possible to believe that unrestricted sub-
marine warfare never would have been
discontinued by Germany, in view of the
fact she had nothing to gain by stopping it.

When the Sussex case came up, "note-
writing" forced precipitate German re-
sponse to a temporary victory.

This statement of course is disputed
and conjectured; many observers say
the British navy stopped the U-boat out-
rages; but discussions as to causes are
not so important as the fact itself: the
course taken by the Lusitania and the
Sussex notes. Germany made radical
concessions to American demands. She
broke her pledge when she found it ex-
pedient to do so; but the future will show
that the delay and the restrictions placed
on the U-boat campaign by the American
stand for our maritime rights has been
of the highest strategic value in the for-
tunes of the war.

United Nations Back of Wilson.

When the President finally broke with
Germany, he found a united nation be-
hind him; he found that his forbearance,
his delay, his restraint had paid him the
highest dividends in the unification of the
sentiment of the country.

There was a universal feeling that he
had exhausted all honorable means of
averting a break, and had fallen through
German delinquency. There were no
longer any obvious technicalities as to
whether "mistake" had been made by the
submarine commanders, any conflict of
evidence about "warning" and "visit and
search," any fine-point legalism as to
whether the ship in question was a pri-
vate or a public vessel. "We broke" on
an issue that was clearly joined.

THE PRESIDENT'S "PEACE PLAN"

Nothing has been more generally mis-
understood, at home and abroad, than
the President's celebrated note to the
belligerents following the German peace
proffer of December 12. It was not only
formal announcement of our abandon-
ment of "isolation"; it was an offer to
place the resources and power of Amer-
ica in any organization to guarantee
the peace against the aggression of
any one, or any group, of its integral
parts.

On this point the comment of the New
Republic is most interesting:
"For the first time in the history of the
country an American official document
has made European business American
business by offering to abandon the
isolation of the past and from a respon-
sible part of the European international
system. The note expressly declares the
American people 'stand ready, and even
eager, to co-operate' in the protection of
weaker nations against violence 'with
every influence and resource at their
command.'"

What Note Pledges.

"What we say to Europe is this:
'We will guarantee with our resources
and our lives the objects of the western
democracies, but before we do that those
objects must be distinguished from the
objects of the imperialists. The note is
a declaration of our alliance with the
liberals of Europe.'

The whole current of the "peace note"
and the Senate address, is anti-German
in its implications. What could be fur-
ther from German imperialism, German
autocracy than the program which the
President outlined. Its direct appeal was
to the liberals of France and England;
an attempt to restore their morale in the
face of the imperialism which war had
intensified in those nations.

In the light of what is known now, in
the light of what has transpired in the
last month, does not the note, and the
address, constitute a repudiation of all
that Germany stands for before the
war? Does not the exploded pretensions
she has made from time to time as a
protector of small nations?

From this point of view the peace note
not only reveals the President's diver-
gence from the path of neutrality, but
reveals the fact that he realized the whole
course of American self-interest de-
manded that the nation be not found,
at the close of the war, high and dry with
a sterile neutrality as its sole asset to be-
gin its enforced embolism in world
politics.

Under the plan of the League to En-
force Peace "the neutral nation would
thereafter assume some of the cost of
war which might not involve any
national interest; but it would be suf-
ficiently compensated. Neutrality would
no longer involve the danger of being
either the victim or the parasite of the
belligerent powers."

Is Index to War Policy.

The President's note in the light of
after events has developed new signifi-
cance as an index to his war policy. It
asked first of all a definition of war pur-
poses, and terms of peace; and inter-
posed the question of peace or war, as
an attempt to "smoke Germany out."

The President was fully aware of what
Germany was fighting for, he needed no
formal statement from the Wilhelmstrasse
to inform him on this point. But he
knew that the German motive was not
not been dramat